Anthropic’s Claude Enterprise

In a nutshell

As organizations race to integrate Anthropic’s Claude into their daily operations, the focus has shifted from simple "chat" to autonomous, integrated workflows. Claude Enterprise, while offering robust safety and constitutional AI, still introduces a unique set of Identity and Access Management (IAM) challenges. Unlike traditional cloud services where identity is often abstracted, AI agents like Claude Code operate within the same OS-level identity context as the developer running it meaning any over-broad local permissions that already exist are fully inherited by the agent, creating a massive, invisible expansion of the identity attack surface.    

The identity dilemma: High power, static access

I’d argue that the primary risk in deploying Claude Enterprise isn't just the data sent into the model, but the identity footprint required to make it useful. To truly enhance productivity, Claude needs access to repositories, internal documentation, and even production environments.    

In many organizations, this access is granted via standing privileges. A developer might be assigned a "Premium Seat" with broad read/write access to a GitHub organization or a cloud environment. Because Claude functions as an extension of that developer, any identity-based vulnerability, such as credential theft from MCP server config files, OAuth scope abuse, or prompt injection that leaks secrets into logs  is immediately magnified. If the human has standing access to a sensitive .env file or a production database, the AI agent does too, and it can be tricked via prompt injection to exfiltrate that data. While Claude Code can include human-confirmation checkpoints for sensitive operations by default, these can be disabled or bypassed in automated pipelines, making prompt injection a credible and underappreciated exfiltration vector.    

Key challenges in the Claude ecosystem    

Identity delegation and privilege mirroring    

Claude Code and similar agents typically inherit the permissions of the local user context. This "mirroring" means that traditional defenses are bypassed and instead risk is associated with the authorization and access paths held by the user. If a developer has standing admin rights "just in case," those rights are now a liability for every AI-driven command execution.    

The shadow AI integration trap    

While Claude Enterprise supports SSO and SCIM, the real risk often lies in the "connectors", the Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers and third-party integrations that developers use to give Claude context. Community and self-hosted MCP servers frequently rely on static API keys or persistent tokens that are rarely audited and while Anthropic's documentation recommends OAuth-based authentication for production deployments, enforcement is left entirely to the implementing organization    

Prompt injection as an IAM vector    

Unlike traditional IAM threats, prompt injection attacks don't target the identity system directly but they target the agent's reasoning. An attacker can embed malicious instructions inside a webpage, code comment, or document that Claude reads during a task, silently redirecting its actions within the permissions it already holds. This makes prompt injection a uniquely dangerous threat in agentic environments: the agent is fully authorized, fully authenticated, and doing exactly what it was told just not by you.    

RBAC sprawl in the AI enabled workspace    

Managing access within the Claude Enterprise console introduces a new layer of administrative overhead. Organizations often struggle with "Role Explosion," where new roles are created for every project or team, leading to a fragmented view of who can actually manage API keys, view usage logs, or configure sensitive "managed settings."    

Moving toward Zero Standing Privilege (ZSP)    

These challenges are not unique to Claude Enterprise, but they are amplified by its ease of access and broad applicability. Security and identity teams can reduce risk by applying familiar IAM principles in a new context.    

• Minimize standing access to AI tools: Treat AI access like privileged access, not a default entitlement. Regularly review who has access and remove dormant users. Where possible, align access duration with role and task requirements rather than employment status alone.
• Introduce purpose-based access decisions: Not every role needs unrestricted AI access. Define acceptable use cases by function (for example, drafting versus data analysis) and ensure access policies reflect those distinctions.
• Align AI access with data sensitivity: If certain teams handle regulated, confidential, or security-sensitive data, ensure AI access is governed accordingly. This may include tighter review processes, restricted prompts, or additional oversight for high-risk roles.
• Control autonomy level as an access dimension: Claude Code's risk profile changes significantly when auto-approve mode is enabled. Treat the level of human oversight from full confirmation required to fully autonomous as a governed access setting, not a developer preference.
• Make AI usage auditable and reviewable: Identity governance doesn’t end at provisioning. Monitor usage patterns, identify outliers, and review access regularly. AI access should be something you can quickly and easily prove to an auditor, not something you rediscover during an incident.
• Inventory and govern MCP server connections: Require teams to register and document all MCP servers in use, including their authentication method and data access scope. An unaudited MCP server with a static API key and access to your codebase is a standing privilege by another name.
• Plan for lifecycle events, not just onboarding: Joiners are easy. Movers and leavers are where risk accumulates. Ensure AI access is automatically adjusted when roles change and promptly revoked when users exit the organization.

In a nutshell…    

Claude Enterprise is more than an assistant; it is an over-privileged and under-governed actor within your infrastructure. The transition from conversational AI to agentic AI means that identity is no longer just about "logging in", it’s about the persistent, standing permissions that these agents inherit. By shifting toward a model of Zero Standing Privileges and implementing just-enough and Just-in-Time access for AI-driven workflows, security teams can empower their developers without turning their most productive tools into their greatest identity risks.